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This paper presents a model of a developing economy that endogenizes both technological
biases and demographic trends. As knowledge diuses from foreign R&D-producing re-
gions, potential innovators decide which technologies to develop after considering available
factors of production, and individuals decide the quality and quantity of their children after
considering available technologies. This interaction creates multiple growth paths. I nd
that if developing countries wish to achieve good prospects for income convergence, they
should adopt fairly skill-intensive technologies, even if this initially creates a technology-skill
mismatch. Such knowledge 
ows are more likely to promote the twin growths in human
capital and technologies characteristic of the biggest economic success stories.
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The last half century has seen the robust growth of some nations and the persistent stagnation
of others. This is particulary true of the developing world; while rich nations have maintained
fairly consistent rates of growth (2 or 3% per annum), poorer nations have traversed widely
dierent growth paths (between -1 and 7%). This paper suggests a possible reason behind such
divergence by producing a model emphasizing the interdependence between directed technical
change and demography. As general knowledge diuses from foreign R&D-producing regions,
potential innovators decide which technologies to develop after considering available factors of
production, and individuals decide the quality and quantity of their children after considering
available technologies. This interaction creates the possibility for multiple growth paths - some
economies develop labor-intensive techniques and expand the pool of unskilled labor; others grow
into societies of highly skilled individuals using sophisticated skill-intensive techniques. Which
path will lead to greater prosperity is the primary focus of this paper.
The model emphasizes how dynamic ineciencies can create such multiple paths. If the time
horizon over which an individual maximizes utility is nite, cross-generational incentives may not
be well aligned. These incentives are important for long-run growth in a world where education
and skill-intensive technologies are strategic complements, and where education and unskilled-
intensive technologies are strategic substitutes. If directed technological growth promotes skill
accumulation in one generation, a virtuous cycle of technological and human capital growth can
form for subsequent generations. If however innovation fosters population growth and limits
education, technological growth can constrain the welfare of later generations and encourages
similar behavior, resulting in a low growth trap.
This approach constitutes a notable departure from the existing literature on technologies
that augment specic factors or sectors. These works often highlight the \inappropriateness" of
growth in technologies that can be implemented by only a small portion of the economy. For
example, Basu and Weil (1998) and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) illustrate how technologies
designed for capital-intensive (physical or human) societies that diuse to developing regions
are used ineectually there, if at all. And Mokyr (1999) explains that the British Industrial
Revolution initially produced only minor improvements in living standards because technical
progress occurred in just a few small industries. These papers suggest that technologies catered
for the abundant factors of production are more appropriate for the economy and will provide
robust future growth.
But as we will see, allowing both factors and technologies to co-evolve changes the complexion
of the problem, and alters the very meaning of what \appropriate" is. In the context of this
treatment, I nd that developing countries should promote the adoption of at least semi-skilled
ideas from the knowledge frontier, irrespective of their own endowment levels. Although tech-
nological progress in this case may be considered statically inappropriate for these economies'
2large levels of unskilled labor, they may produce dynamically healthy incentives to invest and
limit population growth, and hence improve living standards in the long-run. Thus taking an
alternative route by promoting unskilled-intensive techniques may better employ the great pools
of labor available in developing regions, but it will not produce the twin growths in human capital
and technologies characteristic of the biggest economic success stories.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 refers to some past literature, and
motivates the approach by looking at some cross-country data. Section 3 presents the full model
in steps, rst presenting a model of endogenous technological bias, and then merging this with
a simple theory of demography. This model then motivates our discussion in section 4, which
highlights the importance of skill-intensive technological growth both in general and in specic
simulated examples. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
2 Accounting for Development
2.1 Past Literature
Growth economists often used to divide themselves into two distinct groups. One tended to
to associate the accumulable factors of production (mainly physical and human capital) as the
primary vehicles to prosperity (e.g. DeLong and Summers 1991, Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992,
etc.). The other group stressed technological dierences across countries as the main source of
income disparity (e.g. Romer 1990, Aghion and Howitt 1992, etc.). More recent studies however
have begun to explore the simultaneity of \objects" (the factors of production) and \ideas"
(technologies). For this paper I derive insight from three general branches of literature - papers
where the `ideas' of interest are factor-specic technologies, papers where the `objects' of interest
are dierent labor-types, and papers where the subject of interest is the interaction between the
two.
Papers that analyze factor-specic technologies include Katz and Murphy (1992), Acemoglu
(1998) and Kiley (1999), which attempt to explain rising skill-premia in developed countries, and
Xu (2001), which attempts to explain international trade patterns. More related to this paper,
a few studies have also explored biased technologies in the context of technological diusion and
development. These include Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), which compels developing countries
to employ exactly the same technology as the developed one, and Caselli and Coleman (2000),
which allows countries to choose the technology most appropriate to them given their factor
supplies. However these studies all treat the factors of production as exogenously xed.
Research on endogenous fertility, on the other hand, investigates how the micro decisions of
households over the number of children and the level of education of each child can aect the
macro economy. Becker and Lewis (1973) initiate this literature, while Becker and Barro (1988)
develop a similar framework in a growth model; both cases model altruistic parents who make
3consumption and fertility choices by maximizing a dynastic utility function. Moav (2005) models
parents who decide both the number of children and the level of human capital of each child. Here
instead of focusing on the potential utility of their children, parents concentrate on the potential
income of their children. These models capture the quality-quantity tradeo individuals face in
choosing their ospring, but remain silent on the technological environment.
Finally, theoretical models that consider interactions between endogenous technological change
and skills include Stokey (1988), where innovations are the accidental by-products of learning by
doing, and Chari and Hopenhayn (1991), where agents can use new technologies only by invest-
ing in vintage-specic human capital. Other papers have endogenized both human capital and
technological change, including Grossman and Helpman (1991), Young (1993), Redding (1996),
Galor and Weil (2000) and Galor and Moav (2000). I build on this literature by also looking
into the roles of directed technology and international knowledge diusion.
2.2 A Cross-Section of Factor-Specic Technologies
If the research environment encourages the advancement of techniques used by the abundant
inputs to production, we should have a sanguine outlook for the developing world. For example, a
country awash in unskilled labor may simply develop and adopt labor intensive technologies, thus
militating against anemic growth. Hence a world where each country can shape its technological
destiny would be one where technologies are tailored to best suit the factoral composition of an
economy.
In order to better appreciate this we attempt here to map out the eciencies of dierent labor





Here we specify production as one with a constant elasticity of substitution skilled and un-
skilled labor aggregates (this elasticity being 1=(1 ). Al;i is the eciency of unskilled labor in
country i and AH;i is the eciency of skilled labor in country i.1
Furthermore, if factors of production are paid their marginal products, the \skill-premium"


















we can back out each country's implied pair of technological coecients in precisely the same
1This functional form resembles the production function used in section 3, where we endogenize technological
growth; eciency coecients will proxy for the breadth and depth of factor-complementary machines.
4fashion as Caselli and Coleman (2006).2
Key to this exercise is our parameter choice for   1. Careful empirical labor studies such
as Autor et al (1998) and Ciccone and Peri (2005) have found that the elasticity of factoral
substitution between more and less skilled workers most likely lies between 1 and 2 (consistent
with a value of  between 0 and 0.5). We should add that when H is considered anyone with an
8th grade education or more,  is likely to be higher for most countries. So both for this exercise
and the simulations, we choose a benchmark value of  = 0:5 for a proxy elasticity parameter
most applicable for a wide range of countries and for a wide variety of skill-unskilled categories.3
Table 1 reports these backed out measures of Al-Ah pairs. Figure 1 depicts the relationships
between relative technical skill-bias, relative skill-endowments, and income per capita across a
broad array of countries. Immediately clear is the positive associations between skill-bias and
skill endowment, and between skill-bias and income levels. These positive relationships hold
whether we consider a skilled worker as someone who completed primary school, or someone who
completed high school, or even someone who completed college. This was precisely one of the
main points behind Caselli and Coleman's study. Not only do wealthy nations enjoy large pools
of human capital, but they also employ this capital far more eectively than poorer nations.
From these scatterplots emerge two puzzles. The rst is the standard chicken-or-egg question.
Does a country naturally endowed with a lot of human capital imitate/develop technologies best
suited for this type of skilled workforce, becoming wealthy in the process? Or rather, does
a country blessed for whatever reason with a rich pool of skill-intensive knowledge inherently
provide the incentives necessary for growth in education? That is, is the path to wealth a
technology story, or an investment story?
Second but no less a puzzle is the question of why un-skilled-intensive productivity fails to
produce prosperity. According to standard directed technical change theories (see for example
Kiley 1999, and Acemoglu 2002), if a country is populated primarily by the un- or under-
educated, local innovators would simply direct their innovative energies toward technologies that
would complement them. But the promise of symmetric opportunities for skill- and unskilled-
intensive societies alike clearly fails to deliver in practice. Models which allow economic forces to
endogenously shape technological direction thus add another layer of sophistication that shows
more yet explains less.
This paper suggests that the co-evolution between factors and technologies may in part explain
these puzzles. Skill-bias knowledge and human capital may reinforce each other, just as unskilled-
2The data is also from Caselli and Coleman (2006). Y is average GDP per capita for 1985-1990, taken from the
Penn World Tables. Labor levels are constructed using the implied Mincerian coecients from Bils and Klenow
(2000). Wages for skilled and unskilled are constructed using Mincerian coecients and the duration in years of
the various schooling levels. See their paper for more details.
3Ciconne and Peri (2005) themselves estimate  to be 0.5 when considering U.S. high school dropouts as
unskilled labor and high school graduates as skilled labor (although their preferred measure is 0.33).
5bias knowledge and unskilled labor may reinforce each other. If the composition of the economy
is what is most crucial (so that the large sectors of the economy are the ones that grow fastest),
then either path will create robust growth. But if there are negative dynamic consequences
for unskilled-intensive development (such as population growth), then per capita growth from
unskilled bias technological change will be muted. Thus a model of virtuous and vicious cycles
may explain not only the scatter diagrams of Figure 1, but the general observation that poorer
countries have experienced wildly dierent growth rates in the last 50 years. These ideas are
made more concrete in the model of section 3.
2.3 A Cross-Section of Demographic Characteristics
Along with a combination of technologies, a country chooses a combination of factors through
household decisions on education and procreation. A cross-country sample of these decisions are
depicted in Figure 2. Here observations are sized according to the country's income per capita.
We can observe a negative correlation between population growth and education, a negative
correlation between population growth and living standards, and a positive correlation between
education and living standards.
It is also commonly believed that child labor is a symptom of poverty (Edmonds and Pavcnik
2005). This should be important to us, since a child working is a child not in school. The
International Labor Organization's Statistical Information and Monitoring Program on Child
Labor (SIMPOC) most recently estimated that 211 million children, or 18% of children 5-14, are
economically active worldwide (ILO 2002). Figure 3 illustrates the strongly negative relationship
between living standards and the percentage of 10-14 year-olds who are employed.
Thus we observe that prosperity is associated with low fertility rates, high education rates,
and low child-labor participation rates. Further, from our observations in the previous section,
we can say that these characteristics are also associated with high relative eciency levels of
skilled labor. The theory in the following sections will combine these observations. While these
scatter diagrams are cross-country representations taken at only one moment in time, we might
speculate on what economic developments led up to these relationships. As such we view these
static pictures as the primary impetus to develop a dynamic model of growth.
3 The Model
In this section we present a simple model where global knowledge 
ows spur local factor-
specic invention. Subsection 3.1 illustrates the production side of the economy. Subsection 3.2
illustrates the research and technology adoption side. Subsection 3.3 merges this approach with
a simple theory of demography; the combined model allows us to evaluate the co-evolution of
6factors and technologies so that we can judge in the next section the true \appropriateness" of
dierent kinds of technological developments.
3.1 Production
Consider a discrete-time economy. We use the production function given by (1) but now we




















Here both types of labor (unskilled L, and skilled H) work with intermediate \machines" to
produce a homogenous nal output. I make the rather stringent assumption that these machines
can complement either skilled labor or unskilled labor, but not both. Machines (of type j) which
complement unskilled labor are denoted by xl
j, while machines which complement skilled labor
are denoted by xh
j.
The parameter  indicates the degree of substitutability between skill and unskill-intensive
\sectors" in aggregate production. When  = 1, the production function is linear; when it is 0,
the production function is Cobb-Douglas; when it is  1, the production function is Leontie.
As we mentioned in section 2.2, estimates of this elasticity clearly place  above zero; thus we
will assume that these sectors are grossly substitutable, so unbalanced growth (progress that
is conned to just one of the sectors) can still produce growth overall. Indeed, we see such
unbalanced growth stories throughout the world. For example, a farm in India likely employs
many uneducated workers using scythes, while a farm in Western Europe probably employs a few
workers skilled at using sophisticated agronomic instruments. This characterization of dierent
labor-types using dierent types of machines, or \production processes," with which these labor
types are compatible seems a reasonable approximation for actual technological biases.
Technological advance is assumed to come in two varieties. In the \unskilled labor sector,"
technical advance comes about from an expansion in the number of intermediate machines spe-
cialized for unskilled labor (that is, an increase in Ml). Similarly, in the \skilled labor sector,"
technical advance means an expansion in the number of intermediate machines specialized for
skilled labor (an increase in Mh).
Final goods output produced by dierent rms is identical, and can be used for consumption,
for the production of dierent intermediate machines, and for research and development to
expand the varieties of skill-augmenting and unskilled-augmenting machines. For each time
period (suppressing time subscripts for the moment) these rms endeavor to maximize:
7max
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Intermediate machines, on the other hand, are produced either in monopolistic or competitive
environments. Specically, an inventor of a new machine at time t   1 enjoys monopoly prof-
its for machine production at t. After this, however, patent rights to this machine expire, and
subsequent production is performed by many competitive manufacturers. Whether a machine is
produced monopolistically or competitively will be conveyed in its rental price, denoted either
as p(j) for a unskilled-labor using machine j or p(k) for a skilled-labor using machine k, and
explained in the next sub-section. For simplicity, we assume that all machines depreciate com-
pletely after use, and that the marginal cost of production is simply unity in terms of the nal
good.
Assuming for the moment that both technology levels Ml and Mh and labor types L and H
are given, an equilibrium can then be characterized as machine demands for xl(j)'s and xh(k)'s
that maximize nal-good producers' prots (from equation 5), machine prices p(j) and p(k) that
maximize machine producers' prots, and factor prices wl and wh that clear markets.

































Note that here a greater level of employment of a factor raises the demand for intermediate
goods augmenting that factor so long as  > , an idea consistent to what Acemoglu refers to
as a \market-size eect." We will assume throughout the analysis that this condition is met.



















In this section we endogenize the growth paths of Ml and Mh. Local researchers expend re-
sources to develop new types of machines, but they will be heavily in
uenced by the international

ow of knowledge. We make these modeling choices to stress that the nature of technological
8growth for developing countries depend both on local conditions and technological diusion from
advanced countries.
With regard to the time required to develop a new machine, assume that it takes one period
from when the costs of development are incurred to when the machine can be monopolistically
produced and sold. With regard to the costs of development, these will depend both on the
number of machine types already extant (indexed by Ml and Mh), and on the current level of
factor-specic frontier knowledge (denoted by 
l and 
h, and discussed below). Thus the costs
of innovation are allowed to evolve in this economy. Specically, the up-front cost of developing


























for a skilled labor augmenting machine, with the assumption that  > 1. These functional forms
illustrate that the costs of invention are negligible when frontier technologies are far advanced
relative to \local technologies." As local technologies begin to outstrip frontier technologies,
however, costs become increasingly prohibitive.4.
Given these costs of technological advance, innovating rms must receive some prots from the
development of a new technology in order to make research and development worth the expense.
As mentioned above, we assume that developers of new machines receive monopoly rights to
the production and sale of their machines for only one period. As a result, we must make a
distinction between old machines (those invented before t) and new machines (those invented at
t).
The rate of interest with which prots are discounted are pinned down by consumers' pref-
erences. However, we lose no insight if I treat the interest rate simply as the time discount
factor. Assuming unitary marginal costs of machine production, the steady-state present values
of prots from new machines of both classes are given by:










4This approach of varying the cost of research based on distance from the frontier of knowledge echoes the
leader-follower model illustrated in Barro and Xala-i-Martin 2003)
9Because demand is isoelastic, the price which maximizes monopolists' prots equals 1= for
both skill- and unskilled-augmenting machines, so that demand for new intermediate machines
are notated simply as:
























On the other hand, because older machines are competitively produced, their prices equal
unitary marginal costs, so that curves for old intermediate machines are:
























Thus factor-specic TFPs given by equation (3) can be re-written as an aggregation of two












































h;old + Mh;new x
h;new
H (11)





















where xl;new and xh;new are given by (8). An individual is free to research, guaranteeing that:














where of course Mz;old + Mz;new = Mz;t for factor z (that is, factor-specic technology is the
cumulation of all past innovation and all new innovation). If resource costs of research were
actually less than discounted prots, entry into research would occur, driving local technology
levels, and hence costs, up. I assume this happens quickly, so that valuations never exceed costs
in any time period. Further, since applied research is irreversible (a society cannot forget how
to make something once it is learned), the variety of machines remains unchanged when the
inequalities in (12) or (13) do not bind with equality.
The levels of frontier knowledge in the economy are key determinants of the costs of developing
new \production processes;" higher levels of 
z lower the costs of developing intermediate ma-
chines which complement factor z. Conceivably these technological levels arise from the research
output of other more developed economies; as such we can consider the growth of 
l and 
h as
exogenous to our economy of interest. Furthermore, countries which produce the most amount of
technological output (and thereby which are most likely to in
uence the developments of 
L and

H) are those countries most likely already in their steady-states. As a result I allow reference













where g > 0 is the growth factor.5 Thus we see that (12) and (13) also capture our notion
of barriers to technology adoption - if 
l and/or 
h are too small, factor-specic technological
growth cannot happen. Indeed the economy cannot begin to technologically grow until this
\reference technological frontier" is suciently developed.
The steady-state can be characterized as one where the share of labor devoted to each sector
(skilled and unskilled) remains xed, while output, the stock of basic research knowledge, the
varieties of skilled and unskilled complements, and wages all grow at the same rate, g. This will
occur so long as equations (12) and (13) hold with strict equality. But as these equalities imply
there may be a considerable period of time when growth is unbalanced; this would occur if only
one of the equations held with equality. What kind of unbalanced growth is likely to unfold will
depend on a number of things, including the available supply of dierent factors (a relatively
large L for example raises Vl and thus increases the chance that growth will be unskill-biased)
and the relative \skewness" of the knowledge frontier (a relatively large 
l for example lowers cl
and likewise increases the chance for unskill-biased growth).
5Subsequent work may endeavor to endogenize the evolution of this \frontier" knowledge. Note here however
that the recent skill-biased technical change literature suggests that 
h has grown faster than 
l, particularly
throughout the 1980s and 90s (Acemoglu 2002; Goldin and Katz 2007). This would only reinforce our suggestion
that skill-intensive growth is the superior path to development; as such I wish not to rely on this assumption.
11Clearly unbalanced growth is slower than balanced steady-state growth, but surely growth
in the bigger sector will produce faster growth overall.6 This indeed is the essence of the ap-
propriate technology story - typically it involves a story of factor abundance. By its logic, a
country awash with throngs of unskilled labor would do well to develop and adopt technologies
readily employable by them. The tragedy stressed in this tale often involves the nature of the
technology frontier - because cutting-edge technologies produced by wealthy nations tend to be
skill-intensive, developing nations face a large (
h=
l); consequently they are forced to adopt
technologies for which they are structurally ill-suited, resulting in anemic growth in general.7
Yet compelling as the appropriate technology story is, we would feel delinquent of duty to
end the tale there. The symmetrical opportunities on display in this model belie the reality
so transparent from Figure 1 - countries that do have a relatively large unskilled workforce do
make them relatively more productive. But countries do not get wealthy that way. The simple
model on display here thus seems to miss some notable aspects of growth - countries seem able to
\shape" their own knowledge frontier in such a way as to adopt technologies for their abundant
factors, but such a shift towards unskilled-intensive growth seems not to produce much per capita
growth. Why not?
We would suggest that incentives to change the factors of production themselves may be an
important part of the answer. Specically, changes in the relative rewards to factors due to
technological developments surely will alter the incentives to accumulate education or to remain
an unskilled laborer. From the model we can write the \skill premium," the skilled wage relative
























In the absence of any demographic response, skill-bias technological growth will raise the skill
premium (by raising Mh;new), while unskill-bias technological growth will lower it (by raising
Ml;new). But surely if unskill-intensive growth lowers the relative returns to skill, this will induce
people to remain unskilled and so not accumulate human capital. The question we now want to
ask is if this model can be combined with a fairly simple model of demography that can capture
this idea. The next section endeavors to do precisely that.
6If a




a+b, which is smaller than, but converges to, g. The smaller is b relative to
a, the closer will this growth be to g.
7The development literature is lled with anecdotal evidence of this technology-skill mismatch, highlighted in
Todaro and Smith's seminal text. \Gleaming new factories with the most modern and sophisticated machinery
and equipment are a common feature of urban industries while idle workers congregate outside the factory gates."
(pp. 256 in Todaro and Smith 2006).
123.3 Endogenous Demography
What if individuals were allowed to respond to changes in the technological landscape? Eco-
nomic forces after all tend to heavily shape the demographic composition of a society. At the
same time (as modeled in the previous section), technological developments tend to follow the fac-
tors that can implement them, and so are strongly shaped by demographic composition. Thus,
we can conceive of a simultaneous solution model which embodies this symbiotic relationship
between technologies and resources.
Here we explore this possibility by extending the core model in the following fashion. We now
adopt an over-lapping generations framework where individuals have three stages of life: young,
mature, and old. Only mature adults are allowed to make any decisions regarding demography.
Specically, the representative household is run by an adult who decides two things: how many
children to have (denoted nt) and the level of education each child is to receive (denoted et).
The modeling arrangement is now as follows. An individual born at time t spends fraction
et of her time in school (something chosen by her parent), while devoting the rest of her time
as an unskilled laborer. At t + 1, the individual (who is by this time a mature adult) works
strictly as a skilled laborer, utilizing whatever human capital she had accumulated as a child in
the skilled sector. At this stage she also decides the quantity and quality of her children (nt+1
and et+1, respectively), and sets them out to toil as unskilled workers. After incurring the costs
of child-rearing, the adult consumes all the income she and her family have generated, but only
after she has distributed a set fraction of her skilled-income to her parent. No credit markets
exist, so adults consume all surplus production. At t + 2, the individual is old, does not work,
and consumes only what is redistributed to her by her children. After this the individual expires
and exits the economy.
This 3-stage OLG framework is most appropriate for developing nations, whose children often
work instead of go to school, and whose elderly often require care from their grown children.
Further, in the absence of well-dened capital markets, education serves as a metaphor for
capital, and therefore as a tool of investment. An adult who invests in the \quantity" of children
will earn a return relatively quickly (through increased unskilled income), while one who invests
in the \quality" of children must wait before there is a payo (through the redistribution of
future skilled income).8
Given all this, let us specify a utility function which a mature adult will wish to maximize.
For the individual born at time t, utility can be written as:
8We could allow adults to continue to work as unskilled laborers if they would earn more doing so. In this case
whatever human capital they had accumulated would be left idle. However, given parameter values and initial
conditions in the simulations, an adult will always earn more as a skilled worker, and so will always be one if
given the choice.




where C1t and C2t denote the consumption in period t of adults and the elderly, and r is the
discount rate. Thus I maintain the assumption (for simplicity) that agents are risk neutral, and
are strictly motivated to increase the present value of their income regardless of when they receive
it.
From the discussion above, I dene consumption streams as follows:
C1t+1 = [1   ]wh;tH(et 1) + wl;tnt[1   et]   wh;t'(nt;et)
C2t+2 = wh;t+1H(et)nt
where H() is the production function for skills, '() is the time required to raise children,  is
the fraction of skilled-income that an adult must relinquish to his elderly parent, and wages wl;t,
wh;t and wh;t+1 are determined by (7). Thus the individual born at time t   1 will choose the
pair fnt;etg that maximizes (15).
Note that the skilled wage for next period, wh;t+1, will depend on technological coecients
which are determined by researchers this period. Families therefore decide the demographical
variables by solving (15) taking technological coecients as given, while researchers determine
tech coecients by following either (12) or (13) taking demographic variables as given. Finally
note that the fertility rate nt translates directly into the pool of unskilled labor this period, while
education rate et translates into the pool of skilled labor next period. Thus solving (12), (13)
and (15) simultaneously at every moment in time allows us to generate a path of demographic
and technological variables.
The rst-order condition for the number of children is:







The left-hand side illustrates the marginal benet of an additional child, while the right-hand
side denotes the marginal cost. At the optimum, the gains in income from an extra unskilled
worker in the family and an additional source of retirement income precisely osets the foregone
skilled-income that results from child-rearing.











Here the left-hand side is the marginal cost and the right-hand side the marginal benet. At
the optimum, the gains received from the added retirement income at t + 1 osets the foregone
unskilled- and skilled-income requisite for an additional unit of education for all children at t.
14Completing the model requires functional forms for H() and '(). In order to have a globally






nt (1 + et)

With these simple functional forms, we can propose the following:



















That is, if there are diminishing returns to education and convex costs of child rearing, an adult
who observes a widening skill premium will not only endow her children with more education
(thus increasing H), she will also reduce her number of children (thus decreasing L). For an
un-rigorous \visual proof" of this, see Figure 4.
Combining this model of demography with our model of biased technologies is straightforward.
Through the simultaneous solving of (10), (11), (12), (13), (16) and (17), a unique set of variables
Lt (n
t), Ht+1 (e
t), Mh;t, Ml;t, Al;t and Ah;t is determined for every time period t. We can perhaps
synopsize our ndings by initially focusing only on the choice of e
t and Mh;t. If an adult expects
researchers to currently develop new skill-biased technologies for future implementation (and so
to increase wh;t+1), she will want to endow her children with more human capital. Similarly,
if researchers anticipate a larger pool of human capital in the future, they may wish to expand
their research of skill-biased technologies. Consequently we can plot the two \reaction functions"
of each group as two upward-sloping curves; the development of new skill-using machines and
the accumulation of skills are strategic complements. From the intersection of these reaction
curves we nd the unique simultaneous solution of the level of education and the new skill-biased
technical coecient. This is done in Figure 5. Furthermore, each et corresponds to a unique nt
(depicted by the intersection of the the rst-order curves in Figure 9).9
To summarize, potential researchers look to the skill composition of the workforce (something
that is shaped by households) to determine the direction and scope of technical change. Further,
households look to relative wages (something that is shaped by researchers) to determine the
levels of skilled and unskilled workers. Accordingly I do not take a stand on the direction of
9The actual algorithm solves a 10-by-10 system. This system is reiterated with more detail in the Appendix.
15causality between technology composition and labor composition. Since our model is built on an
overlapping generations framework (so that successive time units are at least a decade apart),
we may plausibly say that both occur simultaneously within a given interval of time.
4 "Appropriate" Growth Paths for a Developing Country
- Two Experiments
Now that we have a model that endogenizes the growth paths of both technologies and factors,
we may better assess the appropriateness of alternative development paths. Let us consider a
hypothetical developing country endowed with a lot of unskilled labor but little human capital.
Given this demographic composition, unskilled-bias technological growth will conceivably aug-
ment a large part of economy and therefore substantially contribute to overall growth. Let us
call this the composition eect of technological change. At the same time, Proposition 1 suggests
that such unskilled-intensive growth will raise fertility rates and lower education rates by putting
downward pressure on the skill premium. Let us call this the capita eect of technological change.
The question we want to ask is: Are there plausible scenarios where the positive composition
eects fail to outweigh the negative capita eects of unskilled-intensive growth?
We answer in the armative by having two thought experiments. First, we perform a nu-
merical exercise by comparing dierent changes in the economy, using the lessons of the model.
Second, we perform a numerical exercise by dynamically simulating the model itself. These
experiments constitute the next two sections of the paper.
4.1 Unbalanced Growth - A Comparative Static Experiment
One of the main lessons of the model is that technological progress involves changes to both
technologies and factors. To better judge these eects, let us totally dierentiate the per capita
version of the production function given by (1):





















Both types of technologies and both types of factors have the potential to change. Notice
the dL term on the left hand side, which is there to suggest that changes in unskilled labor is
tantamount to changes in population. While this is in fact what the model suggests, strictly
of course this is not true. However, in a world of no labor migration or obsolescence of skills,
changes in unskilled labor and population should be highly correlated; therefore dL is a fair
approximation for both changes in population and changes in unskilled labor.
When there is unskill-biased technological change, the total change in income per capita can
be written as








 1 (L  dAl + Al  dL) + (AhH)
 1 (Ah  ( dH))

(19)
where dyunsk is the total change in income per capita with unskilled intensive growth. Here we
assume that Ah does not change (hence dAh = 0) and that this type of technological growth has
de-skilling eects (hence the negative sign in front of dH). On the other hand, when there is
skill-biased technological change, the total change in income per capita can be written as








 1 (Al  ( dL)) + (AhH)
 1 (Ah  dAh + (AhdH))

(20)
where dysk is the total change in income per capita with skilled intensive growth. Here we
assume that Al does not change (hence dAl = 0) and that this type of technological growth has
anti-fertility eects (hence the negative sign in front of dL).
We want to know whether or not unbalanced unskill-intensive growth is better than unbalanced
skill-intensive growth. That is, we ask if dyunsk > dysk? Setting dAl = dAh = dL = dH = 1 (so
that changes in factors and technologies are symmetrical) and rearranging this condition a bit
gives us the following condition:
Proposition 2 Unbalanced unskilled-intensive growth will be faster for overall growth than un-









This simply states that the unskilled sector must be suciently large relative to the skilled
sector in order for unskill-intensive growth to produce more per capita output than skill-intensive
growth. Notice that these relative sizes depend not just on factor endowments (L and H), but
also how eective these factors are in production (Al and Ah).
To test whether or not Proposition 2 holds for most countries, we require cross-country data
on L and H (which once again we have from Caselli and Coleman 2006), Al and Ah (which we
back out from equations (1) and (2), and a choice for the value of . Based on our discussion in
section 2.2, we use both  = 0:33 and  = 0:5.
Table 2 reports our ndings. With the exception of Jamaica, we see that dyunsk < dysk for each
characterization of L and H when  = 0:5. On the other hand, when  = 0:33 dyunsk < dysk for
17the majority of our countries only when H is considered those with a primary school education or
more. The dierence arises because when the skilled and unskilled sectors are more substitutable,
the unskilled sector is not much larger than the skilled sector (this is because Ah and Al are
fairly close to each other in value); in this case the positive composition eects of unskilled-
bias growth do not oset the negative capita eects, even when H is narrowly categorized as
college graduates. On the other hand, more complementarity between the sectors pulls Ah and
Al further apart; as such the skilled sector becomes much smaller, and so composition eects
tend to dominate capita eects as our categorization of H gets narrower.
We thus conclude that there are indeed plausible cases when skill-biased growth leads to more
per capita output growth, even among the poorest and most unskill-labor abundant countries.
The capita eects will tend to oset the composition eects of unbalanced growth the greater is
the elasticity of substitution between unskilled and skilled labor, and the broader is our denition
of skilled labor.10
4.2 Unbalanced Growth - A Simulation Experiment11
The above exercise tests the eects of unbalanced growth in a general and comparative static
way. However, we may also wish to know the dynamic implications of the specic model delin-
eated in section 3. That is, by actually endogenizing the micro-economic incentives for researchers
and families, we can generate actual values for dAl, dAh, dL and dH over time.
Further, the model also suggests a relationship between the \technological frontier" that a
country faces and its own prospects for growth. Specically, by equations (12) and (13) we see
that the more skewed is the technological frontier towards skilled-oriented knowledge, the greater
is the likelihood that the early stages of growth for the developing country will be skill-intensive.
While we do not endeavor to endogenize the skewness of the frontier, we should acknowledge
how this skewness relates to our hypothetical economy's relation to the developed world. For
example, a \technologically open" economy would have access to the most highly advanced
knowledge produced in the world - given that most basic research takes place in the highly skill-
endowed G-5 countries (Jones 2002), this openness will most likely raise (
h=
l). On the other
hand, a relatively closed-o society would likely not only have lower levels of both 
l and 
h (so
that economic takeo will be delayed), but also have a lower (
h=
l) (so that when economic
10Note that the liberal denition of skilled labor would be most appropriate for precisely those under-developed
economies on which we are focussed.
11A note on parameterization here: the lessons of the simulation story require the following parameter restric-
tions - 0 <  < 1, 0 <  <  < 1, 0 < k < 1,  > 0, and  > 1. In words, this simply means that people
discount the future, there are diminishing returns to machines and education, skilled and unskilled labor types
are grossly subtitutable, there is a positive coecient for \human capital production," and there are rising costs
for child-rearing. So long as these basic restrictions are met, the overall conclusions that follow the simulations
will hold.
18growth does occur, it is more likely to be unskill-intensive).
The end lesson perhaps is that there are many things an under-developed nation can do to
shape its technological frontier - the question for us is what would be the appropriate shape,
one where (
h=
l) is small, or one where it is large? This is simply another way of asking if
dyunsk > dysk - if so we should want a relatively low (
h=
l), for skill-intensive growth would be
inappropriate for such an economy.
To answer these questions, we simulate a few scenarios of the full model, varying only ini-
tial levels of L and H and the initial position of the reference technological frontier 
H=
L.12
Specically, we consider an economy with a relatively high initial endowment of H=L = 0.5 (in
line with a country like India when we consider H as those with a primary education or more, or
a country like South Korea when we consider H as those with a secondary education or more),
which we call Economy A, and an economy with a relatively low initial endowment of H=L =
0.25 (in line with a country like Kenya when H is considered those with a primary education or
more), which we call Economy B.13
All other parameters (enumerated at the bottom of Figure 6) are the same for all simulations
- all we vary are the technological frontier and the factoral endowments of our hypothetical
developing economy. For all cases we run the simulation for 30 time periods. The technological
frontier exogenously expands out in an even fashion (
l and 
h grow at the same rate g) and
our developing economy responds to these changes.
The case we show in Figures 6 and 7 is Economy A - this economy has the relatively high
ratio of skilled to unskilled labor of 0.5. For the simulation of Figure 6 we set values for 
l and

h so that unskilled technologies are the rst to develop, and this happens at t = 5. At t=27,
near the end of the simulation, 
h has grown such that Mh nally begins to grow as well. At this
point both sectors expand the number of machines used, and growth is nally balanced. Notice
that during the period of unbalanced growth, fertility rates rise and education rates fall; this
is because as unskilled technologies grow, the skill premium falls, and this induces households
to respond demographically through Proposition 2. As a result, growth in output per capita is
lower than growth in overall output until balanced growth is achieved.14
For the economy of Figure 7 we reverse this experiment. That is, we set 
l and 
h such that
the skilled sector begins to grow at t=5, and the unskilled sector grows at t=27. This produces
the opposite demographic response - fertility rates fall and education rates rise. In this case then
unbalanced growth produces faster per capita growth than overall output growth.
12n is normalized to 1 at the start of each simulation to maintain a constant population.
13Again, see the Caselli and Coleman (2006) study for how the data for L and H is constructed.
14Those dissatised with such imbalanced growth may do well to recall the words of Abramovitz and David
(1973): \...economic growth as we have known it is not a balanced steady-state aair in essence...Rather, central
features of the historical process of growth since the earliest years of the Republic may be viewed as part of a
sequence of technologically-induced traverses, disequilibrium transitions between successive growth paths."
19Thus we see that unskilled growth produces lower per capita growth but aects a larger part
of the economy, while skilled growth produces higher per capita growth but aects a smaller part
of the economy. In order to judge which unbalanced growth path is superior, we need to compare
per capita growth income for each case. In this fashion, we can pit the two growth paths against
each other and see which one comes out ahead. The top portion of Figure 8 shows the results of
this race. It is clear that for this endowment structure, skilled growth is \better" - the positive
capita eects oset the negative composition eects.
However, for economy B where H=L is set to 0.25, we reach a dierent conclusion. For
each kind of technological frontier, we get very similar fertility, education and income paths
as Economy A (not shown). However, in this case the positive capita eects of skill-intensive
growth tend not to oset the negative composition eects over time - the unskilled sector in this
case is simply too large. This is illustrated at the bottom of Figure 8. Here unskill-intensive
technological growth is indeed the superior growth path.
The fact that economy A performs better under skill-intensive growth than unskill-intensive
growth introduces an alternative interpretation of what is appropriate in technological growth.
The strategic complementarity between skill acquisition and skill-biased technical development
underscores the possibility of virtuous cycles of technology growth and accumulation. Here skill-
biased technologies are inherently superior not because they augment a large portion of the
economy (neither for economy A nor B is the skilled sector larger than the unskilled sector) but
rather because they provide families with the incentives to accumulate human capital and limit
fertility. As such economies which face a technological frontier skewed towards the skilled are
likely to benet from growing skill-intensive techniques even if they are heavily endowed with
unskilled labor.
The slower growth prospect for economy A with unskill-bias growth is simply the by-product of
a dynamic ineciency. Agents of each generation do not concern themselves with the long-term
welfare implications of their demographic decisions. The myopia inherent in the inter-temporal
structure of the economy is not quite as harmful when skill-biased techniques are developed, for
then cross-generational incentives are better aligned. But when unskilled-biased techniques are
the rst to grow, this myopia can prove to be an anchor for growth; the incentive that spurs the
agent to have more children with less human capital leaves the next generation worse o, and
gives them little choice but to do the same.
However, we must acknowledge that these dynamic eects may not prove to be so disastrous,
depending on the relative size of the unskilled workforce and their current productivity. If for
example we consider a skilled worker only those with a college degree or more, then the \skilled
sector" may be so small that adopting technologies for this labor type will not produce much
benet. Indeed this is the case of our simulated economy B.
These numerical examples simply underscore the conceit that not all technologies can be held
20as equally benecial. A nation thronging in unskilled labor may initially nd it in its interest
to have a low 
H=
L and thus allow it to develop labor-complementary techniques. But such
developments may leave individuals with little incentive to invest in education. A country on
such a path could nd itself in a vicious cycle of rising population and slower output per capita
growth, even as it implements new technologies all the while. This may in part explain why
poor countries can not seem to alleviate their poverty simply by improving unskilled-intensive
techniques.
5 Conclusion
This paper has suggested the existence of low-growth traps. But we have also suggested that
these traps can come in various forms. Most developing countries have a great deal of unskilled
labor relative to skilled labor. But whether they should adopt unskilled-intensive technologies
will depend on more than this. It will partly depend on the structure and composition of the
economy (including how eective the skilled and unskilled already are, and how substitutable
they are). And it will partly depend on the dynamic consequences of such adoption. This paper
has suggested that these considerations make what is appropriate in technology adoption a far
more complicated aair than what the current literature on the subject implies.
We also suggest that these considerations are hugely important for today's developing world;
careful country-specic studies can test the various ideas proposed here. For example, the ex-
plosive postwar growth enjoyed by Japan and South Korea has continually fueled the debate on
objects versus ideas - while empirical studies such as Christensen and Cummings (1981) credit
large technological gains for these growth \miracles," Young (1995) and others highlight the
unprecedented role of factor accumulation in these cases. We have stressed here that both may
be necessary for robust economic convergence to the developed world; specically, skill-biased
technologies foster both accumulation and technical progress, the twin engines of growth.
On the other hand, population growth in countries such as India and Bangladesh have only
recently begun to slow down. We should study how the well-documented world-wide perva-
siveness of skill-intensive technologies (Berman and Machin 2000; Berman, Bound and Machin
1998) could have played a role both in these regions' economic struggles and in their recent de-
mographic turnarounds. We should also consider how India's economic isolation and insistence
on an alternative from the \Western" growth path could have exacerbated its divergence from
Western living standards.
Of course the story told here is merely one of many possible explanations for low growth traps.
Heterogeneities in institutions, geographic fortunes and social capital are but a few of the many
determinants for economic divergence. We have focused attention on the proximate sources of
growth (factors and technologies), abstracting from deeper dierences without dismissing them
21as unimportant. But many questions remain, and much work is left to do. Yet surely the
relationships between factors and ideas play a prominent role in the riddle; this model should
serve as an incremental step towards resolving it.
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25Appendix: The Simulated System
For each time period t, the following ten equations are solved for Ml;new, Mh;new, Al, Ah, wl,
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(21) and (22) illustrate the benets and costs of innovation; (23) and (24) are factor-specic TFP
levels as functions of the demand for old and new machines and factors of production; (25) and
26(26) are wages; (27) and (28) are the benets and costs of having children and educating them;
(29) and (30) describe how fertility and education choices translate into factors of production.
Note that if either of the rst two equations holds with strict inequality, the algorithm sets the
value of Mnew to zero and simply solves the the rest of the system.
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                                       Figures 
Figure 1 – Relative Technologies vs. Relative Factors and Output (σ = 0.5) 
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•  Source:  Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003).  Observations are sized according to income per capita. The 
graph illustrates both that a negative relationship exists between cross-country measures of fertility and 






















•  Source:  International Labor Organization (2002) 
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•  While the actual solutions for n* and e* cannot be conveyed analytically, we can solve them by 
numerical simulation.   Here we plot the first order conditions solved by households in {et, nt,} 
space.  The dotted lines illustrate the first order condition with Mh = 15, while the solid lines show 
the first order conditions where with Mh = 20.  From this change, we can observe that the foc(n) 
shifts down, while the foc(e) shifts to the right.  Both changes serve to raise e* and lower n*.  This 
relationship is robust to a wide range of parameter values.   
 
•  Note that an increase Mh will raise both wh,t and wh,t+1. 
 
•  We should further note that a raise in wl
  will have precisely the opposite effect (That is, the curves 
































•  The steeper line represents the level of education per child a parent would choose for a given 
technological parameter Mh.  The flatter curve represents the skill-biased technical coefficient that 
would result from a given level of education per child.  Note that for a very low level of education 
per child, no resources are devoted to skill-intensive research, in which case the skilled sector 
remains stagnant. 
 














Directed Technical Change with Endogenous Factors  
 
 
   

































































•  Parameters are set to the following values:  σ = 1.5, τ = 0.25, β = 1.8, Θ = 10, k = 0.5, r = 0.25, φ = 
1.8, g = 1.02, α = 0.33 (see footnote 11 for motivation).  Initial technologies are set as M1
L = 10 and 
M1





•  The dotted cost lines are the cost of research functions (the right hand sides of equations 12 and 13).  
The solid value lines are the value of research functions (the left hand sides of equations 12 and 13).  














Directed Technical Change with Endogenous Factors 
 
 







Market for Unskilled-Bias Technologies
 
 





Market for Skilled-Bias Technologies
 
 













































output per capita growth
 
 
•  Here H/L remains at 0.5, while Ω
H/Ω
















Figure 8 – Comparison of Two Economies 
 
Economy A (H/L = 0.5) 
Low Ω
H/Ω
L versus High Ω
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Income per Capita with Skill-bias Growth
Income per Capita with Unskilled-bias Growth
 
 
•  The dotted line is the simulated income per capita generated by the simulation from 
Figure 6.  The solid line is the simulated income per capita generated by the simulation 
from Figure 7. 
 
Economy B  (H/L = 0.25) 
Low Ω
H/Ω

















Income per Capita with Skill-bias Growth
Income per Capita with Unskilled-bias Growth
 
•  The full simulation results for these two cases are not illustrated. 
  
 
Table 1 – Cross-Country Values of Al and Ah 
  
             σ=0.33                                       σ=0.5 
          H=primary                H=secondary                  H=college                   H=primary              H=secondary                  H=college 
 
Country Al Ah Al Ah Al Ah Al Ah Al Ah Al Ah
ARG 4.8 53.2 29.5 18.0 49.9 4.7 18.3 73.9 44.7 56.1 57.9 37.8
AUS 1.5 170.4 38.5 72.6 112.3 10.9 16.2 189.1 81.7 143.0 137.7 64.2
B O L 9 . 4 1 0 . 21 8 . 6 4 . 4 2 7 . 4 1 . 2 1 8 . 22 1 . 92 5 . 51 7 . 43 1 . 11 0 . 9
BWA 5.1 6.4 12.1 1.6 14.0 1.1 9.2 15.2 14.2 12.7 15.1 16.7
B R A1 1 . 72 6 . 21 9 . 62 9 . 62 9 . 02 6 . 12 5 . 25 0 . 73 2 . 67 8 . 13 9 . 3 1 0 6 . 1
CAN 0.3 219.3 43.7 81.6 166.9 2.0 7.9 228.9 92.9 160.4 180.4 29.2
CHL 3.1 30.0 12.6 19.0 25.7 5.9 11.1 43.0 22.0 46.6 31.3 35.6
CHN 4.4 4.7 11.8 0.7 16.3 0.0 8.7 10.0 14.2 4.3 16.6 0.5
COL 6.2 28.3 17.5 19.3 30.1 7.9 16.7 46.7 27.8 55.2 36.3 50.8
C R I 7 . 4 2 3 . 91 7 . 61 6 . 32 6 . 71 0 . 31 8 . 54 1 . 22 8 . 54 5 . 23 4 . 94 7 . 3
C Y P 1 . 7 6 0 . 81 2 . 24 4 . 63 4 . 91 2 . 91 0 . 37 4 . 32 7 . 08 4 . 64 5 . 26 0 . 5
D O M1 3 . 51 3 . 92 5 . 9 6 . 8 3 4 . 2 3 . 4 2 5 . 43 1 . 23 5 . 02 7 . 94 0 . 12 5 . 0
ECU 2.8 28.1 9.6 22.1 17.8 14.2 10.0 39.8 18.5 47.9 25.1 52.1
SLV 14.3 7.6 26.3 2.3 31.8 0.8 23.3 20.8 31.6 14.7 34.6 11.5
FRA 6.1 123.7 51.2 48.4 102.2 9.5 29.4 159.0 84.5 129.7 118.6 74.8
GHA 5.5 2.6 11.7 0.2 13.2 0.0 8.8 7.2 12.7 2.4 13.6 1.1
GRC 6.5 91.1 71.4 12.7 107.9 2.1 30.4 118.1 99.4 48.1 121.3 21.4
G T M1 2 . 91 4 . 62 4 . 3 9 . 0 3 1 . 4 6 . 1 2 3 . 63 3 . 93 2 . 33 8 . 93 6 . 64 7 . 1
HND 2.9 12.9 6.4 13.9 13.4 3.9 7.3 21.9 10.8 35.4 15.7 29.9
HKG 6.7 98.2 44.8 37.1 108.8 2.1 30.2 128.7 77.2 92.9 119.3 26.2
H U N 4 . 9 4 9 . 34 5 . 1 5 . 4 6 1 . 2 1 . 4 1 9 . 76 7 . 15 8 . 72 5 . 16 8 . 41 4 . 3
IND 10.7 3.5 18.0 0.9 22.7 0.1 16.6 10.6 21.4 6.0 23.9 2.5
IDN 2.4 13.1 10.3 3.8   6.5 21.3 13.3 17.7    
ISR 4.4 102.0 25.1 63.2 82.0 9.3 23.8 127.5 56.2 118.6 100.6 54.2
ITA 34.3 109.4 157.3 13.6 231.6 0.7 95.1 176.6 201.2 66.9 243.6 16.9
J A M0 . 11 5 . 71 . 22 8 . 63 . 82 4 . 81 . 01 8 . 32 . 95 1 . 25 . 2 1 0 0 . 9
JPN 2.5 105.6 37.5 35.1 79.6 7.2 17.5 125.4 65.9 85.6 95.7 46.5
KEN 4.4 3.0 9.2 0.5 10.1 0.3 7.1 8.3 10.2 4.9 10.7 6.4
M Y S 5 . 6 3 4 . 32 6 . 7 9 . 9 4 9 . 2 0 . 3 1 7 . 55 1 . 83 7 . 93 5 . 65 1 . 4 8 . 5
M E X 6 . 8 4 8 . 72 1 . 63 6 . 53 9 . 11 7 . 92 1 . 07 4 . 03 7 . 29 1 . 64 9 . 59 1 . 6
NLD 2.1 150.0 52.1 43.1 105.8 7.9 17.9 171.6 87.5 111.9 124.1 58.4
NIC 10.8 6.5 17.1 3.9 21.1 2.7 18.1 17.2 22.6 17.0 25.2 18.1
PAK 15.1 5.9 24.4 2.2 31.4 0.5 23.2 17.7 29.5 14.2 33.5 8.4
PAN 1.1 28.1 5.6 24.8 14.7 10.5 5.4 35.7 12.2 47.5 19.7 44.2
P R Y 6 . 1 1 4 . 41 6 . 1 6 . 4 2 3 . 3 2 . 4 1 3 . 92 6 . 72 2 . 42 4 . 02 6 . 91 9 . 8
PER 7.2 25.5 19.6 13.7 32.7 4.9 19.2 42.2 31.5 38.2 40.3 28.0
PHL 1.6 18.8 8.2 9.0 14.9 3.5 6.4 25.5 14.4 21.7 19.3 16.7
POL 1.3 53.1 37.3 4.7 54.9 0.6 9.7 62.6 49.5 20.5 59.9 7.9
PRT 14.8 41.9 50.5 10.2 71.1 2.0 35.9 73.6 65.8 47.3 77.4 27.0
KOR 0.5 61.0 8.4 42.8 32.0 7.9 5.1 68.2 20.7 74.8 39.9 42.6
SGP 9.4 75.6 42.8 33.5 75.0 8.2 30.6 112.2 64.5 105.5 85.3 74.2
L K A 4 . 0 2 0 . 72 1 . 7 3 . 3 3 4 . 8 0 . 0 1 2 . 23 1 . 72 8 . 21 5 . 33 5 . 5 1 . 7
SWE 2.5 133.5 20.4 93.6 95.6 8.8 19.1 155.6 54.0 155.5 114.9 57.1
CHE 1.4 157.6 22.1 103.0 112.6 5.1 14.5 176.0 56.9 174.2 127.2 48.4
TAI 4.8 74.8 35.1 26.8 79.7 2.2 22.4 97.5 59.6 68.7 89.0 23.5
T H A 6 . 4 1 2 . 61 8 . 2 3 . 6 1 9 . 7 4 . 1 1 4 . 02 4 . 22 3 . 51 7 . 12 4 . 32 3 . 6
T U N2 2 . 31 1 . 13 5 . 4 5 . 3 5 0 . 6 0 . 8 3 6 . 43 0 . 44 5 . 52 5 . 75 4 . 61 2 . 6
GBR 4.9 117.1 56.7 30.7 105.5 5.3 26.6 146.0 89.0 89.6 121.0 44.8
USA 0.0 146.7 3.4 162.5 48.6 37.7 1.8 149.4 19.3 201.4 71.2 126.0
URY 5.2 41.6 26.3 14.3 44.2 3.9 17.8 60.3 39.5 45.4 51.3 30.9
VEN 17.0 50.0 44.6 25.0 74.3 7.6 42.7 86.0 68.5 75.6 88.3 52.2








Table 2 - Values of 
 
   
 
σ = 0.5        σ = 0.33 
Country H=primary H=secondary H=college H=primary H=secondary H=college
ARG 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.7 1.3 2.3
AUS 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.7 1.8
BOL 0.4 0.3 0.3 1.0 1.4 2.3
BWA 0.7 0.5 0.3 1.5 3.3 4.3
BRA 0.3 0.2 0.1 1.0 1.1 1.0
CAN 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.7 3.3
CHL 0.5 0.4 0.3 1.0 1.4 2.3
CHN 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.0 1.4 2.1
COL 0.4 0.3 0.2 1.0 1.3 1.9
CRI 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.9 1.3 1.7
CYP 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.7 1.0 1.7
DOM 0.3 0.3 0.2 1.0 1.5 2.2
ECU 0.5 0.4 0.3 1.0 1.3 1.7
SLV 0.4 0.3 0.2 1.1 1.9 3.0
FRA 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.9 1.9
GHA 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.2 2.0 3.2
GRC 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 1.4 2.5
GTM 0.4 0.2 0.1 1.1 1.6 1.8
HND 0.8 0.7 0.3 1.4 2.0 3.1
HKG 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.9 2.8
HUN 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.5 1.5 2.2
IND 0.4 0.4 0.4 1.0 1.5 2.1
IDN 0.7 0.7   1.3 2.6
ISR 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.8
ITA 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 2.0 4.6
JAM 2.2 2.4 0.7 2.6 4.3 3.0
JPN 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.9 1.9
KEN 0.8 0.8 0.4 1.5 3.4 5.7
MYS 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.8 1.4 3.7
MEX 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.8 1.1 1.4
NLD 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 1.0 2.1
NIC 0.4 0.4 0.3 1.1 1.7 2.2
PAK 0.3 0.3 0.2 1.2 1.9 3.2
PAN 0.7 0.7 0.4 1.1 1.6 2.3
PRY 0.5 0.4 0.3 1.1 1.7 2.7
PER 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.8 1.2 1.9
PHL 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.9 1.3 2.0
POL 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 1.3 2.0
PRT 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.7 1.5 2.9
KOR 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.7 1.0 2.1
SGP 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.6 1.1 1.8
LKA 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.8 1.6 3.1
SWE 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 1.9
CHE 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 2.4
TAI 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.5 1.0 2.5
THA 0.5 0.4 0.3 1.0 1.8 2.2
TUN 0.3 0.2 0.2 1.1 1.6 3.0
GBR 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 1.1 2.3
USA 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.6 1.2
URY 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.7 1.4 2.3
VEN 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.7 1.1 1.9
DEU 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.4 1.7 3.5  
 
  Note:  Values greater than 1 imply that dyunsk > dysk. 